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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent changes in the strategies of US airlines have led to a convergence of unit 
costs between the Network Legacy Carriers (NLCs) and Low Cost Carriers (LCCs).  We 
develop a methodology for breaking down operating cost data reported by the airlines 
and argue that certain cost categories must be excluded to make a valid comparison 
between the carrier groups.  We find significant evidence of convergence in unit costs 
excluding fuel and transport-related expenses, and labor unit costs in particular.  While 
NLCs have improved cost efficiency through dramatic labor cost reductions and longer 
stage length flying, LCC labor unit costs continue to increase as these former new entrant 
airlines mature.    
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1. Introduction 
The US airline industry has been in a financial crisis for much of this new 
century, a crisis exacerbated by the terror attacks of 9/11.  The rapid growth of Low-Cost 
Carriers (LCCs) in the US domestic market presented the traditional Network Legacy 
Carriers (NLCs) with intense price competition, as the LCCs fully exploited the 
significant cost advantage they enjoyed at the time.  High costs and a declining revenue 
environment pushed four out of six NLCs1 into bankruptcy.  Whether under bankruptcy 
protection (United, US Airways, Delta and Northwest) or under the threat of bankruptcy 
(American and Continental), the NLCs have made efforts to reduce their cost structures 
and to improve their labor and aircraft productivity.  These significant cost cuts 
contributed to the industry achieving modest profitability in 2006, for the first time since 
2000.   
This paper examines the extent to which the NLCs have been able to reduce the 
unit cost gap that historically has existed between them and their low-cost rivals.  We 
examine the evolution of unit operating costs in the US airline industry from 1995 to 
2006 and the underlying forces driving change.  We conduct an in depth analysis of US 
DOT Form 41 financial and operating cost data to show that the NLC’s cost-cutting 
strategy has resulted in substantial cost convergence between them and their low-cost 
counterparts.  While a superficial comparison of total unit costs might suggest that the 
gap between NLCs and LCCs has increased since 2000, we present a breakdown of unit 
costs that clearly demonstrates that significant convergence has occurred. 
                                                 
1 The term “Network Legacy Carriers” refers to the six largest traditional US carriers: American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United and US Airways 
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In Section 2, we provide a brief review of relevant literature. Section 3 describes 
the dataset that we have used and explains our approach for determining airline group 
selections, the logic for excluding certain components of reported cost data in our 
comparisons, and the methodology used to aggregate the unit cost metrics.  Section 4 
presents the analysis of unit costs and is broken down into two parts: We first compare 
aggregate measures of unit costs between the NLC and LCC groups. We then take a look 
at individual airlines in both groups and provide more detail to help explain the observed 
convergence of unit costs.  Section 5 summarizes the findings and discusses some of the 
implications of our analysis.  
2. Literature Review 
The focus of most studies of airline cost performance has been on comparisons of 
unit cost, specifically Cost per Available Seat Mile, or “CASM”.  CASM is defined as 
total airline operating expense over available seat miles (ASMs) produced.  In turn, 
ASMs equal the number of available seats flown by the airline, multiplied by the total 
distance flown by its aircraft.   
The focus of previous studies of airline operating cost performance has evolved 
with historical changes in the airline industry.  Shortly after deregulation of domestic 
airline markets in the United States, Jordan (1982) undertook an extensive study of the 
cost and productivity performance of Canadian airlines.  In the US, early studies of the 
impacts of deregulation included Meyer et al (1981), which looked for trends in airfares 
and service to small communities in addition to airline productivity and unit costs.  
Morrison and Winston (1986) established statistical relationships between airline 
operating cost variables and financial performance, with a focus on fuel and labor costs.  
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Oum and Yu (1998) published an extensive study of productivity and cost 
competitiveness of world airlines, including the consideration of various financial 
indicators.  And, in the US, the Government Accountability Office (2004) issued a report 
with a title that very clearly describes the study’s principal conclusion: “Legacy Airlines 
Must Further Reduce Costs to Restore Profitability”.   
In our comparative analysis of unit operating costs, we focus on the categorization 
of airline operating costs.  Holloway (2003) provides an overview of the various types of 
schemes that have been established to categorize costs in the airline business.  Doganis 
(2006) also discusses airline cost categorization, but concentrates more specifically on the 
importance of labor costs.  He argues that labor costs along with fuel costs are the two 
most important cost categories because, when combined, they usually account for about 
50% of an airline’s total costs.  The breakdown of costs into labor vs. non-labor is of 
particular relevance to the adjustments and comparisons we propose in the following 
section. 
It should be noted that, although both researchers and airline managers often 
focus on the control of operating expenses and unit costs as an important strategy in 
competitive airline markets, low costs on their own do not guarantee profitability.  
Revenues are just as critical to profitability and it could be argued that the recent 
financial crisis of US airlines was caused in large part by extreme price competition that 
lowered industry revenues overall.  Our focus on unit costs excludes the impacts of price 
competition and revenues on airline industry profitability.  However, it is clear that, 
without their lower cost structures, LCCs would not have been able to offer such low 
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fares in US domestic markets.  As in most industries, low-cost producers have an inherent 
competitive advantage. 
 
3. Dataset and Methodology 
The primary source of data used in our analysis consists of Form 41 filings to the 
US Department of Transportation.  We used Form 41 P and B schedules filed by airlines 
to extract the financial and operating data, as shown in Figure 1.  We limited our study to 
1995-2006 because this interval represents three distinct periods of the airline industry 
cycle: The “golden 90s” from 1995 to 2000 when the industry experienced record 
profitability; the restructuring period from 2001 to 2005; and a return to profitability in 
2006. 
Airline Group Selection 
The Network Legacy Carriers (NLCs) are traditional airlines with comprehensive 
hub-and-spoke networks comprised of regional domestic, mainline domestic and 
international services.  In contrast, Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) airlines that have smaller 
networks with a hybrid of hub and spoke and point-to-point network attributes, simpler 
service levels, and a lower overall cost structure that allows them to offer significantly 
lower fares.  Although these definitions seem relatively straightforward, in practice not 
all airlines can be easily categorized as an NLC or LCC.  
For example, Southwest has always been considered a LCC and for good reason – 
they pioneered the concept of maintaining low operating costs in order to deliver a low 
fare product concept.  Still, Southwest’s original point-to-point network structure has 
evolved into a complex hybrid of point-to-point and multi-hub operations.  There are also 
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airlines that fall somewhere between these two definitions. Alaska Airlines does not fit 
clearly into either category. Its cost structure is somewhat lower than some NLCs, yet 
higher than most LCCs and its network structure falls somewhere in between the two 
types of carriers. For this reason, we decided not to include Alaska in our analysis of 
these two distinct sectors. 
The 2005 merger of US Airways and America West resulted in a single airline 
that kept the US Airways name. So far, the carriers have obtained a single operating 
certificate, but their Form 41 data was still filed separately through 2006. For our 
analysis, we combined both airlines into one and included them in the NLC group under 
the single name US Airways (US).   
Our breakdown of airlines is shown in Table 1.  These 12 carriers account for the 
majority of the US airline market share (as measured by RPMs). In 2006, the NLCs 
accounted for roughly 70% of US industry traffic and the LCCs accounted for another 
18%2.  
Unit Cost (CASM) Adjustments 
In making valid comparisons of cost efficiency between NLCs and LCCs, it is 
necessary to make adjustments to the unit costs reported by the carriers to eliminate 
factors that can distort the comparisons.  We identified two factors that can distort unit 
cost comparisons among airlines.  
Transport related expenses for the most part represent payments made by 
airlines to regional carriers to provide services to smaller cities on their behalf, providing 
incremental connecting traffic and revenue to the mainline carrier.  These payments 
                                                 
2 Aviation Daily, US Industry Traffic Market Share, Eclat Consulting, McGraw-Hill, Friday, August 18, 
2006. 
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clearly do not represent actual “operating expenses” related to the provision of the 
capacity (ASMs) output of the mainline carrier.  Since the ASMs of the regional carrier 
are not included in the denominator of unit costs, the payments made to regional carriers 
should not be included in the numerator if we are comparing cost efficiency across 
airlines.   
Excluding Transport Related Expenses from unit cost comparisons is particularly 
important in comparisons of NLCs and LCCs, given that LCCs have generally not been 
active in employing regional partners for traffic feed.  The inclusion of transport related 
expenses in calculating NLC CASM can lead to a significant distortion that favors LCC 
unit cost measurements.  Although the Legacy carriers incur these transport related costs, 
the ASMs produced from these outsourcing activities are not reported as part of the 
mainline operations, leading to what appear to be higher CASM for the NLCs.  This 
distortion has become greater since 2002, when accounting changes required airlines to 
account fully for the fees paid to their regional partners for capacity being purchased, 
increasing the proportion of Transport Related Expenses dramatically for the NLCs.   
Fuel expenses are usually included in unit cost comparisons, based on the 
assumption that all airlines are subject to the same fuel price environment. Although this 
has been the case historically, the emergence of financial hedging instruments has 
provided new ways for airlines to control, or manage, their fuel expenses. The most 
striking example is that of Southwest, which locked in the price of its fuel purchases 
thereby eliminating a great deal of its exposure to the fuel price surge during 2005 and 
2006. The increased use of fuel hedging means that airlines are no longer on a level 
playing field when it comes to reported fuel costs. We believe that these financial 
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decisions should not be included in our cost comparisons – we thus also removed fuel 
expenses from some of our comparisons.  
After removing transport related and fuel expenses from total costs, we can break 
down the remaining costs into two categories:  
Labor costs include total salaries, all social benefits and other costs, paid out to 
employees either directly or indirectly. This category gives an indication of cost of the 
labor inputs in an airline’s total cost structure.  
Non-labor costs include everything that is not part of transport related, fuel or labor-
related costs.  It does include outsourcing which, of course, can have a labor component.  
This category contains cost items that provide a good gauge of how management 
influences “controllable costs” in other areas of its operation. 
A summary of our approach for adjusting CASM is presented in Figure 2. 
Aggregation of Cost Measures 
To report aggregate measures for each airline group, we used weighted averages.  
We summed the quarterly numbers extracted from Form 41 to produce annual totals, and 
then summed the data for each airline group (NLC vs. LCC) before computing cost 
measures using these aggregate results within each group.  For example, the aggregate 
total unit cost of the NLC group is given for year “j” as follows: 
∑
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where i=1,…,6 is the set  of Legacy carriers and “j” represents year “j” of our time period 
(j=1995,…,2006). This formula is equivalent to a weighted average on ASMs of each 
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individual airline for each year “j”.  The same computations are repeated for the LCC 
group of carriers in order to obtain the “LCC” average.  
 
4. Results of Unit Cost Comparisons 
In this section we present the results of our unit cost analysis, in increasing levels 
of detail. The first part examines industry trends by comparing the aggregate unit costs of 
the NLC and LCC groups. The second part presents trends for individual airlines from 
both groups to identify which carriers have been the most successful at reducing their unit 
costs in the labor and non-labor categories.   
4.1. Aggregate Unit Cost Comparison: NLC vs. LCC 
Since 2001, the NLCs have been forced to seek greater efficiency in order to 
survive one of the worst financial crises in their history. At the same time LCCs have 
managed to increase their share of the US domestic market with their alternative business 
models and lower cost structures.  This aggregate analysis examines differences in unit 
costs between the two groups, focusing on the major cost components which include non-
transport related costs, non-fuel costs, labor and non-labor costs.  
As shown in Figure 3, total CASM increased significantly from 1995 to 2006 for 
both the NLCs and LCCs.  From 1995 to 2000 the difference in CASM remained almost 
constant at around 2.6 cents per ASM.  After 2000, the NLC CASM began to increase 
faster than LCC CASM, widening the unit cost gap from 2.6 cents per ASM in 2000 to 
4.4 cents in 2006. During this time period, the NLCs experienced a 30% increase in total 
CASM while LCCs realized only a 15% increase. Based on this misleading comparison 
between the two groups, these results erroneously suggest that the groups are diverging 
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significantly with respect to total unit costs despite the well-publicized efforts of NLCs to 
improve cost efficiency. 
Figure 4 shows that removing transport-related expenses from the reported unit 
costs creates a very different view of the gap in CASM between the two groups.  From 
1995 to 2000 the difference in CASM remains almost constant, as was the case with the 
unadjusted measure.  Since 2000, however, the CASM gap decreased slightly, ending up 
at 2.0 cents per ASM compared to 2.2 cents per ASM in 2000. These results suggest that 
the CASM gap between the two groups has remained stable or even diminished in recent 
years, once the distortions of transport-related expenses are removed. 
By removing both fuel and transport-related expenses we obtain a measure of 
CASM that in our view provides a more consistent cost comparison between the groups. 
The results for this modified CASM (CASMexTF) are shown in Figure 5 and present a 
very different picture yet again. The NLC CASMexTF slightly decreased from 1995 to 
2006 but increased slightly for LCCs.  The biggest changes have occurred between 2001 
and 2006, a period during which NLC CASMexTF dropped 17% from 9.4 cents to 7.8 
cents per ASM, while LCC CASMexTF remained flat at around 6.3 cents per ASM. As a 
result the difference between the carrier groups decreased from 2.3 cents to 1.3 cents per 
ASM, a 43% decrease in the unit cost gap.   
The results suggest that fuel and transport-related expenses have been 
predominant in driving up the reported total unit costs for NLCs since 2000 and that fuel 
has been the main cause of increased unit costs for LCCs.  Once we remove fuel and 
transport-related expenses, we see significant cost convergence in CASMexTF between 
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2000 and 2006.  In order to identify the underlying forces of this trend we further break 
down this cost measure into its labor and non-labor components. 
In Figure 6, we can see that non-labor CASMexTF remained effectively flat from 
1995 to 2006 for both groups. The gap in non-labor CASM between the groups remained 
very stable from 1995 to 2000 at 1 cent per ASM. From 2000 to 2001 the gap widens 
slightly and then narrows until 2004. From 2004 onward, the gap in non-labor CASMexTF 
again begins to increase slightly, as LCCs’ non-labor CASMexTF is decreasing and NLC 
non-labor CASMexTF is increasing. 
The non-labor CASMexTF category includes all remaining costs other than direct 
labor, fuel and transport-related expenses. In this sense it is a reflection of a company’s 
internal cost structure resulting from a variety of factors such as network structure, fleet 
type, and outsourcing activity to name a few.  It is thus difficult to identify the particular 
factors that are most responsible for the variations in non-labor CASMexTF. However, 
given the fact that excluding some variations between 2000 and 2005, the gap between 
both groups has remained stable, we expect to see the convergence in CASMexTF 
identified previously to be explained by a convergence in the labor component. 
As shown in Figure 7, NLC labor CASMexTF followed an upward trend starting at 
3.5 cents per ASM in 1995 and reached a peak in 2002 at 4.5 cents per ASM. Since 2002, 
it has been reduced by almost 30% to 3.3 cents per ASM. On the other hand, LCC labor 
CASMexTF has increased steadily since 1995 (from 2.2 cents in 1995 to 3 cents in 2006). 
These trends have led to a significant reduction of the gap in labor unit costs between the 
carrier groups since 2000, from 1.2 cents in 2000 and to just 0.3 cents by 2006. This is 
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dramatic evidence of convergence in labor unit costs between NLCs and LCCs over the 
past 6 years. 
The large decrease in labor CASMexTF for NLCs is a direct result of the cost-
cutting strategies implemented during the recent financial crisis.  Bankruptcies and the 
threat of bankruptcies have played an important role in allowing NLCs to cut their work 
forces, negotiate lower overall compensation and increase productivity.  On the other 
hand, LCCs have had to deal with increasing seniority and some slowing in their organic 
growth rates, both of which have contributed to higher unit labor costs.  The aggregate 
results thus show that NLCs have been so effective in cutting their labor costs that they 
have become competitive in this respect with their LCC rivals. In other words, the LCC 
advantage can no longer be simply attributed to lower labor costs. 
Figure 8 shows that NLCs have gone through a fundamental transformation of 
their cost structures, particularly their labor cost component.  Fuel and transport related 
expenses have grown from 13% of unit costs in 1995 to over 40% of unit costs in 2006. 
These increases, as well as the labor cost-cutting strategies, have reduced labor costs to 
less than 30% of the total in 2006. The non-labor cost category has also been reduced 
from 45% in 1995 to 30% in 2006.  These results further support the conclusion that fuel 
and transport-related expenses have been the main drivers behind the increase in total 
unit costs shown in Figure 3. 
The results for the LCC group in Figure 9 reflect the same impact of fuel prices. 
The fuel component of total LCC CASM has increased from 15% in 1995 to around 30% 
in 2006. Labor cost proportions have fluctuated throughout the period but remained 
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centered on a value of 30% of total unit costs. The non-labor component of LCC unit cost 
has thus decreased from 50% of the total in 1995 to 35% in 2006. 
In summary, our aggregate analysis demonstrates the importance of making 
certain adjustments to reported unit cost data in order to make valid and consistent 
comparisons of cost efficiency between the NLC and LCC airline groups.  A superficial 
comparison of unadjusted CASM data would incorrectly suggest that the unit cost gap 
between NLCs and LCCs has actually increased since 2001 despite the cost cutting 
efforts of the NLCs.  Once we remove transport-related and fuel expenses, we see a 
substantial convergence of unit costs between the two groups, driven largely by changes 
in the labor cost component – NLCs have cut labor unit costs by 30%, while LCC labor 
unit costs continue to increase. 
4.2. Individual Airline Cost Comparisons 
Consistent with our results from the aggregate cost comparisons, by removing 
fuel and transport-related expenses we see that all NLCs have managed to significantly 
reduce their unit costs in the most recent 5-year period (Figure 10). The biggest decreases 
can be seen for US Airways, United and American at 24% while Continental achieved 
the lowest decrease at 7%. On average, the NLC group experienced a reduction of 16% in 
CASMexTF.  In terms of unit cost rankings in 2006 (Figure 11), Delta had the lowest 
CASMexTF in the NLC group ($0.074) while Northwest was highest at $0.081. As a group 
in 2006, the NLCs had an average CASMexTF of $0.077/ASM with very small variation 
within the group. 
The LCCs had split results over the same period. While JetBlue, Frontier and 
AirTran managed to reduce their CASMexTF, Southwest, ATA and Spirit experienced an 
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increase. ATA unit cost increased by 8%, explained by the difficulties the airline was 
experiencing during its bankruptcy. Spirit’s results were substantially worse than the rest 
of the LCCs as it saw its CASMexTF increase by 25%, which can be explained largely by 
a fleet transformation.  
From these results it is clear that the NLCs have in general been more successful 
at cutting unit costs than their low-cost rivals, pointing towards a changing dynamic of 
cost convergence between the groups.   
Labor Cost Component 
The results shown in Figure 12 reflect a dramatic contrast in labor unit cost trends 
between NLC and LCC carriers.  The most successful NLCs in terms of cutting labor 
costs were those that went through bankruptcy during that period. Among them, US 
Airways led the group with a decrease of 39% in labor unit costs, while American and 
Continental – the two airlines that did not declare Chapter 11 – still managed 18% and 
11% decreases, respectively. On average, the NLCs reduced labor CASM by 25%. In 
2006, US Airways had the lowest labor unit cost among NLCs, at just under 
$0.029/ASM, while American had the highest labor CASM at $0.037/ASM. 
The LCC picture is quite different.  Apart from AirTran and JetBlue who 
managed to reduce their labor CASM, the rest of the LCCs have experienced significant 
increases ranging from 4% at Frontier to 26% at ATA. The LCC rankings for 2006 have 
JetBlue with the lowest labor unit costs at $0.021/ASM while the highest of the group is 
Southwest at $0.034/ASM. Southwest, which accounts for more than half of the LCC 
ASMs, has had to deal with the fact that its pilots and staff are becoming more senior and 
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demanding commensurately higher wage rates. In fact, Southwest’s labor CASM was 
higher in 2006 than any NLC, with the exception of American. 
These results reflect the underlying forces of cost-convergence discussed in the 
aggregate analysis.  All NLCs have dramatically reduced their labor costs, while LCCs 
(led by Southwest which represents the largest proportion of LCC ASMs) have had to 
deal with increased labor costs due to their employees becoming more senior and slowing 
growth.  As a result, in 2006, NLCs had an average labor CASM of $0.032/ASM while 
LCCs had an average of $0.029/ASM. The difference between the groups has been 
reduced to just 0.3 cents per ASM, all but eliminating the historic LCC labor unit cost 
advantage. 
Non-Labor Cost Component 
Figure 13 summarizes the non-labor CASM changes at individual airlines, and 
suggests that both groups of carriers have for the most part managed to reduce their non-
labor CASM between 2001 and 2006. 
The NLCs have managed to reduce these costs by an average of 9%. American 
has made the greatest improvement, achieving a 28% reduction while Northwest was the 
only NLC to see an increase (of 5%), but the results predate any cost decreases being 
fully realized after emergence from bankruptcy. Further, it is important to note that 
maintenance costs stemming from a maintenance workers strike at Northwest have been 
shifted to outsourcing expenses which are included in non-labor costs.  A major factor 
contributing to these non-labor cost reductions is the development of advanced 
information technology systems and the emergence of internet-based distribution and 
passenger processing.  In absolute terms, the NLC group had average non-labor costs of 
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$0.044$/ASM in 2006 with American lowest at $0.040 and Northwest highest at 
$0.048/ASM. 
During the same period LCCs also managed to reduce their non-labor unit costs 
by an average of 5%. Frontier was the most successful achieving a 27% reduction while 
Spirit was disproportionately unsuccessful, with a 27% increase. In 2006, the LCCs had 
an average non-labor CASM of $0.034/ASM which is still a clear advantage of 1 
cent/ASM when compared to their NLC rivals. However, similar to the results for labor 
CASM, the non-labor CASM is also converging.  
The most successful airline at keeping its non-labor CASM low is Southwest.  
The airline’s results stand out from its peers as it is the only LCC to have labor costs at a 
higher level than non-labor costs in 2006.  We can see that during the 2001-2006 period, 
although Southwest was struggling with increasing labor costs as we saw in the previous 
section, it did a tremendous job in reducing its non-labor costs. As a result the airline’s 
CASMexTF has remained almost constant. 
4.3. Unit Costs and Stage Length  
Our discussion of the trends in all measures of unit cost would not be complete 
without some mention of the role of stage length in affecting the unit cost comparisons.  
Theoretical expectations and empirical results suggest that increasing stage length lowers 
unit costs, with all else equal, as the increase in operating expenses attributed to longer 
stage length is less than proportional to the increase in ASMs.  Simply stated, longer 
stage lengths allow the fixed costs of each flight to be spread over more ASMs.   
Figure 14 shows just how active all airlines have been in pursuing this 
fundamental relationship.  We plot unit costs vs. stage length in 2000 and 2006 and to 
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show the change between these two years for each airline we draw a vector originating in 
the year 2000 and ending in 2006.  It is clear that all airlines have been very active in 
increasing their stage length during this period, with most of these increases correlating 
well with lower unit costs of each type examined. 
Figure 14 shows that the trends in CASMexTF are almost uniform across the 
industry. With the exception of ATA and Spirit, all airlines have managed to decrease 
their CASMexTF while increasing stage length. This is in line with the theoretical 
expectations and empirical results.  
5. Summary of Results and Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that during the period 2001-2006, both NLCs and 
LCCs have gone through a period of fundamental change which has greatly affected their 
unit costs.  During this period, the NLCs focused on downsizing and cost-cutting in an 
effort to regain profitability. On the other hand, most LCCs sought to accelerate their 
organic growth and capture significant market share from their NLC peers.  However, the 
LCCs were also facing increasing labor costs driven by an aging fleet and by the fact that 
their staff was becoming more senior.  
A superficial comparison of total unit costs for NLCs and LCCs during the period 
since 2001 would suggest that, despite the substantial efforts of NLCs to improve 
productivity and reduce operating costs, the unit cost gap between NLCs and LCCs has 
increased.  Such a conclusion would be incorrect, based on misleading comparisons of 
cost data that include components that create distortions to unit cost metrics.   
After making several adjustments to the unit cost data as reported, we found 
evidence of substantial convergence in the remaining portions of unit costs between 
 17
NLCs and LCCs.  The most dramatic convergence has occurred in labor unit costs, as 
they have decreased by 25% for the NLCs while continuing to increase for LCCs.  By 
2006, the historical labor unit cost advantage that LCCs have had in this category was all 
but eliminated.  Non-labor unit costs also showed decreases for the NLC group, although 
the 9% reduction is more moderate relative to the drop in labor unit costs.  LCCs took 
advantage of the same technologies and productivity improvements to lower their non-
labor unit costs by 5%, maintaining a 1 cent/ASM gap in this cost metric in 2006. 
Our analysis of the changes in unit costs for individual airlines in each carrier 
group revealed that the NLCs which went through the bankruptcy process realized the 
greatest decreases in labor unit costs.  Among LCCs, the changes in labor unit costs were 
mixed, as the oldest LCC Southwest saw its labor unit costs increase while the less 
mature and more rapidly growing JetBlue and AirTran were able to report a decrease in 
labor unit costs over the 2001-2006 period.  Finally, we explored the relationships 
between stage length and unit cost measures of all categories.  Every airline in our dataset 
showed an increase in stage length between 2000 and 2006, and in many cases the move 
to longer flights correlated extremely well with lower unit cost metrics.   
Driven by competitive forces as well as exogenous events, Network Legacy 
Carriers have used a variety of strategies to reduce unit costs since 2001.  As shown in 
our analysis, there are clear signs of cost convergence in the US airline industry between 
NLCs and LCCs.  At the same time, there remains a gap in unit costs between the two 
groups, explained in large part by the difference in non-labor unit costs.  This gap is in 
many respects structural – while NLCs compete on price with LCCs in the US domestic 
market, they still provide a very different air transportation service as part of their much 
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larger international hub networks.  By operating these networks, NLCs provide on-line 
connections from small US cities to the remote international destinations, something that 
no LCC can provide.  The operating costs of providing such extensive networks are 
inherently greater for many reasons, suggesting that there exists a structural unit cost gap 
between NLCs and LCCs that simply cannot be reduced much further.    
Despite the improvements in cost efficiency among NLCs identified in our 
analysis, the US industry still faces substantial challenges.  The next round of labor 
negotiations may be the most important milestone in the U.S. airline industry since 
deregulation. As demonstrated in our analysis, airline employees have helped contribute 
to the short-term recovery of the industry. Finding a new model for compensation that is 
durable and works to address the cyclicality of the industry will be critical. Just as 
important will be the efforts of management to identify non-labor cost savings that can be 
sustained as networks and operating models are reconfigured. 
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Figure 2: Adjusting Unit Costs (CASM) 
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Figure 3: Aggregate Comparison: Total CASM 
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Figure 4: Aggregate comparison: Ex-transport related CASM 
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Figure 5: Aggregate Comparison CASMexTF (ex transport-related and fuel) 
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Figure 6: Aggregate Comparison: Non-labor CASMexTF
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Figure 7: Aggregate Comparison: Labor CASMexTF  
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Figure 8 Aggregate comparison: NLC CASM % breakdown 
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Figure 9:  Aggregate comparison: LCC CASM % breakdown 
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Figure 10: Change in CASMexTF 2001 to 2006 
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Figure 11: CASMexTF Rankings in 2006 
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Figure 12: Change in Labor CASM 2001 to 2006 
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Figure 13: Change in non-Labor CASM 2001 to 2006 
 
Change in CASMNL 2001->2006
-28%
-15%
-11%
-27%
-18%
-6% -4%
27%
-2%-1%
-4%
5%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
AA UA USHP CO DL NW F9 B6 FL WN TZ NK
`
 
 
Figure 14: CASMexTF vs. Stage Length 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of US Carriers into NLC and LCC groups 
Network Legacy Carriers Low Cost Carriers 
America West and US Airways (HP + US) 
American Airlines (AA) 
Continental (CO) 
Delta (DL) 
Northwest (NW) 
United Airlines (UA) 
 
JetBlue (B6) 
Frontier (F9) 
Airtran (FL) 
American Trans Air (TZ) 
Southwest (WN) 
Spirit Airlines (NK) 
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